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Abstract 
Leverage ratio is known to play a significant implication in financial condition firms. The main objective of the 
study is to examine the relationship between leverage and manufacturing firms’ financial distress in Ethiopia 
from nineteen-ninety nine to two thousand five. Random Effect technique, the panel data General Least Square 
regression method is used. The result shows that leverage has negative and significant influence on financial 
distress.Manufacturing firms should consider the optimal debt capacity of them. Minimize the bank loans 
through equity financing. Improve cash collection and reduce bad debt expenses as remedy for maintaining short 
term cash problem. 
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1. Introduction.  
Financial distress is defined as “the likelihood of bankruptcy, which depends on the level of liquid assets as well 
as on credit availability” Hendel (1996). 
The Financial distress in the firm adversely affects the performance of the firm and results in lower debt 
service ratio. It can be said that the impact of financial distress on debt service coverage is negative and the early 
stage of financial distress could be revenue reduction. The profitability of the firm is decreasing and the liquidity 
ratio of the firms decline due to high leverage of the firm. Financial distress may have a negative effect on the 
leverage of a firm if they give rise to high leveraged or heavily indebted.  The dynamic nature of financial 
distress assumes that while moving in and out of financial trouble, the company passes through separate stages, 
each of which has specific attributes and, consequently, contributes differently to corporate failure. Financial 
distress is time-varying which incorporates that once entering it, the company does not stay in the same state 
until it is liquidated or until it recovers. Changes in financial conditions affect the transition from one state of 
financial distress to another Hill and Perry (1996). If financial conditions become aggravated, the company most 
probably will face bankruptcy; if the performance of the company improves, it has a chance to overcome its 
financial difficulties and recover without defaulting.  
Therefore, an analysis of the coherence of change of financial conditions with the financial status of the 
firm should exploit three main dimensions of the distress dynamics: behaviour over the time window, the impact 
on different financial states, and characteristic features of performance at different distress stages.   
Corporate failure is shown as a three-dimensional process containing the time frame, financial states, 
and process stages. The time window covers the period from the first signs of slight deterioration in performance 
through accelerated impairment down to the deepest point and subsequent recovery. 
 
2. Background of the study 
Leverage is the total debts of the firms. The highly leveraged firms have high debt to equity ratio or high debt to 
total asset ratio.  High leverage leads firms for insolvency due to the urging of current obligation of creditors 
which either leads for bankruptcy, or bankruptcy leads for liquidation or restructuring or reorganization. 
The firm’s FD is the early stage of business failure and the symptoms of FD are the firm is desperately 
short of cash, the firm’s suppliers are pushing for faster payments but the borrowings are at or close to the 
maximum and the firm’s monthly accounts, show that the business is losing money consistently (Brealey etal, 
2000). 
Shleifer (1993) and Vishny (1997) found that complex capital structures make it difficult to isolate 
certain aspects of the causes of financial distress. This may result in inefficient excess liquidation due to 
coordination problems and information asymmetries.  
Based on the trade-off theory, financial distress has gained consideration as an important determinant of 
a firm’s optimal capital structure Opler and Titman (1994)  the trade-off theory suggests that a firm can 
capitalize on advantages from increasing its debt level through tax benefits (i.e., interest expense is tax 
deductible). However, as a firm exceeds the debt level above a certain point, the firm’s degree of financial 
distress begins to increase and costs associated with debt begin to overshadow benefits. Therefore, the firm 
attempts to maintain its capital structure at a balanced and optimal level to avoid the greater costs of debt 
compared to the benefits of debt. 
Two questions are imminent in relation to the relationship among these variables; to what extent does 
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financial distress affect leverage or how firm’s leverage leads for financial distress? And what is the net effect of 
financial distress on the leverage of those firms?  
With this in mind, this study tries to see the relationship of financial distress and leverage of Ethiopian 
manufacturing firms using econometric methods. Regression techniques are employed to see the effect of FD on 
leverage. The paper is organized as follow; the next section deals with literature review on the interplay of the 
four financial variables. The third section covers the econometric analysis. Results are interpreted in the fourth 
section and finally, conclusions are drawn and recommendations are forwarded in the last chapter. 
 
3. Literature review 
3.1. Previous studies 
Leverage is the portion of the fixed costs which represents a risk to the firm. Operating leverage, a measure of 
operating risk, refers to the fixed operating costs found in the firm’s income statement, whereas financial 
leverage is a measure of financial risk, refers to financing a portion of the firm’s assets, bearing fixed financing 
charges in hopes of increasing the return to the common stockholders.  
The higher the financial leverage, the higher the financial risk, and the higher the cost of capital Shim 
and Siegel (1998). 
The firms Leverage ratio show how heavily the firm is in debt. When a firm borrows money, it 
promises to make a series of interest payments and then to repay the amount that it has borrowed. If profits rise, 
the debt holders continue to receive a fixed interest payment, so that all the gains go to the shareholders. Of 
course, the reverse happens if profits fall. In this case shareholders bear all the pain. If times are sufficiently hard, 
a firm that has borrowed heavily may not be able to pay its debts. The firm is then bankrupt and shareholders 
lose their entire investment. Because debt increases returns to shareholders in good times and reduces them in 
bad times, it is said to create financial leverage. 
In general, the more debt a firm uses in relation to its total assets, the greater its financial leverage. 
Financial leverage is the magnification of risk and return introduced through the use of fixed-cost financing, such 
as debt and preferred stock. The more fixed-cost debt a firm uses, the greater was its expected risk and return 
Gitman (1991). 
Ogawa (2003) argues that corporate debt can affect investment by creating debt overhang. Debt 
overhang is defined as deterrence of new investment due to the presence of debt outstanding. It occurs when the 
face value of debt outstanding is greater than its market value. In this case some of the benefits from new 
investment will go to the existing creditors rather than to the new investors. An increase of debt to net worth 
raises external finance premium due to the associated increase in the probability of bankruptcy.   
Due to the significant importance of the financial distress, understanding its determinants has had wide 
examination in the financial economics literature. Through the course of the investigation, the literature shows 
recognition that a firm’s leverage is a main factor that negatively impacts the level of financial distress Opler and 
Titman (1994); Andrade and Kaplan (1998).  
This relatively widely accepted notion has been challenged in the literature which contends that a firm’s 
leverage positively, not negatively, impacts the degree of financial distress Jensen (1989) and Ofek (1993). Such 
mixed and inconclusive arguments involving leverage calls for further investigations and the current study aims 
to enrich the literature, especially by providing specific findings with regard to the lodging industry. Study 
findings suggest that leverage increases the degree of financial distress Lee et al. (2010). 
Opler and Titman (1994) show that the financial distress of highly leveraged companies has its seeds in 
an industrial downturn. The performance decline is exogenous and driven by customers, competitors, and the 
management. Therefore, in periods of economic recession, exogenous risk factors are primary sources of 
financial distress, while managerial incompetence can be rather seen as a response to external shocks. 
Initial under capitalization and assuming debt too early are the two important exceptions from the 
factors cited as reasons for failure of firms in the 1960’s to the 1980’s such as product timing, product design, 
inappropriate distribution or selling strategy, unclear business definition, over reliance on one customer, 
problems with the venture capital relationship, ineffective team, personal problems, one-track thinking, and 
cultural/social factors Janes (2003). Entry into financial distress is defined as the first year in which cash flow is 
less than current maturities of long-term debt. Cash flow is defined as net income plus non-cash charges. 
Inadequate cash flow is a necessary but not sufficient condition for payment default. As long as cash flow 
exceeds current debt obligations, clearly, the firm has the funds available to pay its creditors. However, 
inadequate cash flow to cover current debt obligations does not imply that the firm defaults. Firms have 
numerous options to obtain the cash needed to avert default, including utilizing cash reserves, reducing inventory 
levels, extending trade creditors, drawing upon bank lines of credit, restructuring debt payments prior to default, 
raising equity, and selling assets. If inadequate cash flow continues, eventually these options are exhausted and 
the firm defaults Whitaker and Richard (1999). 
Conceptually, firms facing primarily financial distress are viable as going concerns, have business 
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models that are without fundamental problems, but have high leverage and currently face difficulty repaying 
debts. Firms facing primarily economic distress also have difficulty repaying debts, but are also characterized by 
very low or negative operating performance and a business model with fundamental problems. 
Several studies on financial distress acknowledge the distinction between financial distress and 
economic distress and employ proxies that are associated with one or the other. For example, Hotchkiss (1995) 
cites negative operating performance prior to filing as evidence of economic distress. Denis and Denis (1995) 
associate higher leverage with greater financial distress and less economic distress. Studies that more explicitly 
isolate the effects of financial versus economic distress include Andrade and Kaplan (1998) who study the 
effects of “pure financial distress” using a small sample of 31 highly levered transactions (HLTs). 
They consider these HLTs financially rather than economically distressed in part because many firms in 
their sample exhibit above industry operating margins.   
 
Hypothesis  
This research emphasizes only on the relationship between leverage of the firms and financial distress. 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis: based on literature review the study hypothesizes: 
HQ: there is a negative relationship between leverage and firm’s debt service coverage as proxy for financial 
distress. 
If the more the firm’s debt, the more the probability of the firm’s financial distress.  Bankruptcy is 
usually beginning with the default on debt servicing; thus, the higher the debt, the higher is the probability of 
default (sign -). If the higher the firms leverage, the lower the probability of covering its debt services and the 
higher the probability of financial distress. Therefore, there is negative relationship between leverage and debt 
service coverage as proxy for financial distress.  
 
3.2. Theoretical framework  
3.2.1. Leverage and Financial distress  
The impact of leverage on financial distress is significant.  Leverage effects on financial distress has two sides of 
the process of financial strain influence, either operating side which causes operating risk or financial side which 
causes financial risk (Shim and Siegel (1998). 
Furthermore, high leverage may facilitate FD on firms through inability to pay its debt and increasing 
insolvency and promoting bankruptcy. High leverage contributes to firm’s FD by facilitating inability to meet 
the current obligation and deterioration of cash flow. Ogawa (2003) argues that corporate debt can affect 
investment by creating debt overhang.  Firm’s leverage is a main factor that negatively impacts the level of FD 
(Andrade and Kaplan 1998). Leverage increases the degree of firm’s FD (Lee etal. 2010; Outecheva 2007). FD 
is seen as an intermediate state between solvency and insolvency. A firm is distressed when it misses interest 
payments or violates debt covenants (Purnanandam 2005). 
The firm can capitalize on advantages from increasing its leverage through tax benefits. However, as 
firm’s leverage above a certain point, the firm’s degree of FD increase and costs associated with leverage 
overshadow benefits (Opler and Titman 1994). 
Furthermore, the increase in leverage resulting from increase in total debt to total asset ratio increases 
the firm’s insolvency, thus decreasing DSC. In addition to these effects, high TD to TA ratio also provide a firm 
with high probability of FD, which is often confirms in the each stages of FD will happen.  
Thus, for a variety of reasons, leverage leads firms for FD. The reverse causation from FD to leverage is 
also intuitively straightforward. DSC increment improves a firm’s leverage and hence financial distress 
probability would be minimal.  
 
4. Methods of data collection and Analysis 
In corporate finance financial distress are assumed to be a function of: (i) leverage of the firms; (ii) the liquidity 
of the firms, and (iii) other factors such as efficiency, firm size and so on.  
This study examines the relationship between DSC performance and FD occurrence in Ethiopian 
manufacturing firms for the period from 1999 through 2005.CA to CL ratio, TD to TA ratio, GP to TS ratio, 
EBITD/TA and logTA and then EBIDA to TD ratio of those firms are modeled as a function of DSC and other 
explanatory variables.  
A dynamic model type is formulated: 
FD=βo+β1LEVit+ β2LIQit+ β3PROFSit +β4EFFit + β5 FSIZEit +εit.................. (1) 
    LIQit = the firm’s holding of liquid assets to cover short term debts; 
 
Leverage 
 
Financial distress 
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    PROFSit = the profitability of the firm; 
    SIZEit = the natural logarithm of the firm size measured in terms of volume of assets; 
    EFFit t = efficiency of the firm; 
     LEVit = the level of the firm leverage 
In line with (Pranow etal, 2010) 
        DSC= (EBIDA)/ (TD)...............................................................................................(2) 
        EBIDA= is earning before interest depreciation and amortization 
        TD= principal plus interest or coupon  
For the formulation of the above model (1) we used (Chris brook 2008) econometrics for finance is to 
capture idea. 
Data used for this study are collected from individual manufacturing firms, beverage and metal 
manufacturing firms of Ethiopia. Annual data from manufacturing firms is collected for the period between 1999 
and 2005. Study subject selection is dictated solely by data availability among manufacturing firms. For 
descriptive statistics of the raw data you may refer to Table 1. The liquidity, leverage, profitability, and 
efficiency amount as determinants (DSC) is used for this analysis as the ratio takes care of the differences.    
Generalized Least Square techniques and Random Effect Methods are preferred to infer the better 
relationship between the variables under the situation. Hausman test is performed to choose from the two and 
Random Effect (RE) model is found to give superior result than the fixed effect model. In addition to that, the 
objective of the study is to determine the effect of the factors under consideration on manufacturing firms, not to 
explain the inter-firm difference. This makes RE more desirable than the FE. Following the works of (reference-
model) Random panel effect (RE-GLS) regression method is applied to determine the significance of the effect 
of the explanatory variables on the dependent variables. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Leverage   Determinant 
It is well known that the appreciation of the total debt in the firm relative to total asset (TD/TA) increases 
leverage (Altman 1983) hence, a positive link between the increases of TD to TA and leverage is expected. In 
other words appreciation of TD to TA ratio increases the leverage of the firms. 
The negative coefficient of total debt to total asset for the regression output implies that the increase of 
the total debt relative to total asset affects the firm’s leverage. Converse, the decrease of TD to TA helps the 
solvency of firms.  
This is in line with both theoretical reasoning in corporate finance and findings of previous empirical 
studies (Pranow etal, 2010). The result shows the p-value 0.0000 & negative 0.4762632 percent. A one point 
increase in TD to TA results in a -0.4762632 percent increase in leverage. Though the coefficient is small, the 
effect is statistically significant. This implies TD to TA that targeting may help the solvency subsector of the 
firm. 
 
6. Conclusions and Recommendations  
In recent period manufacturing firms are heavily leveraged. Several factors appear to have contributed to this 
phenomenon including financial distress.  However, to date there has not been that much attempt to investigate 
the role of financial distress on debt service coverage. Using Panel data for the Period of 1999-2005 for 11 
Ethiopian manufacturing firms, this issue is investigated. 
Total debt to total assets ratio has negative and significant effects on debt service coverage but inversely 
on leverage. It means that when the total debt to total assets ratio increases, leverage and debt service coverage 
will decrease.  The results show that there is a negative relationship between leverage and financial distress; 
where high leverage leads for low debt service coverage and as result for financial distress. 
High leverage in the firm affects the firm’s debt service coverage and results in financial distress. The 
financial distress impacts on leverage and leads firms for inability to pay current obligation on scheduled time 
and leads for bankruptcy, liquidation or reorganization.  Firms should have to know its optimal debt carrying 
capacity. The knowledge of optimal debt carrying capacity is significantly implication on the decision of the 
firms. The firm’s debt should not be very small nor very large. It should be optimal. There is a calculation for 
optimal debt ratio for companies. Therefore, companies should go to financial experts and council them and ask 
them how to regularly check the optimal capacity of debt. 
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Appendix :  Regression results  
Table 1. Panel Data Regression Random Effect Model Result 
         rho    .45603781   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .07073068
     sigma_u    .06476254
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.132389   .4616602    -2.45   0.014    -2.037226   -.2275517
         gcg    -.0026728   .0069413    -0.39   0.700    -.0162775     .010932
      opervi     .0192333   .0118305     1.63   0.104     -.003954    .0424207
       fsize     .0558841   .0287628     1.94   0.052      -.00049    .1122583
        leve    -.4762632   .0771539    -6.17   0.000    -.6274821   -.3250443
       liqud     .0623445    .010382     6.01   0.000     .0419961    .0826928
         eff     .7198798    .229787     3.13   0.002     .2695056    1.170254
      profit     .7778155   .2222335     3.50   0.000     .3422458    1.213385
                                                                              
         dsc        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(7)       =    316.52
       overall = 0.9013                                        max =         7
       between = 0.9413                                        avg =       6.9
R-sq:  within  = 0.7630                         Obs per group: min =         6
Group variable: firms                           Number of groups   =        11
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        76
 
Source:  regression result of panel data.       
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Table 2. Hausman specification test for model fitness final 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.1318
                          =        9.83
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
      opervi      .0219268     .0192333        .0026934        .0051822
       fsize      .0859889     .0558841        .0301047        .0330301
        leve     -.5033271    -.4762632       -.0270639        .0296322
       liqud      .0668977     .0623445        .0045533        .0063746
         eff      .5719943     .7198798       -.1478855        .1418454
      profit      .7256655     .7778155       -.0521501        .1282198
                                                                              
                   fixed          .          Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fixed
 
Table 3. BREUSCH AND PAGAN LAGRANGIAN MULTIPLIER TEST FOR HETROSKEDASTICITY 
. 
                          Prob > chi2 =     0.0017
                              chi2(1) =     9.84
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .0041942       .0647625
                       e     .0050028       .0707307
                     dsc     .0774336       .2782689
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        dsc[firms,t] = Xb + u[firms] + e[firms,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
 
Table 4. Tests for multicollinearity problem using correlation matrix 
 
Autocorrelation Tests based on Durban Watson (DW) 
. 
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.116937   .2810325    -3.97   0.000    -1.667751   -.5661236
         gcg    -.0022535   .0032756    -0.69   0.491    -.0086736    .0041667
      opervi     .0002053   .0111451     0.02   0.985    -.0216387    .0220493
       fsize     .0692916   .0183235     3.78   0.000     .0333781     .105205
        leve    -.4800109   .0693894    -6.92   0.000    -.6160115   -.3440103
       liqud     .0529561   .0086854     6.10   0.000      .035933    .0699793
         eff     .8445023   .1778558     4.75   0.000     .4959113    1.193093
      profit     .9177531   .1723939     5.32   0.000     .5798674    1.255639
                                                                              
         dsc        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(7)       =    777.76
                                                               max =         7
                                                               avg =  6.909091
Estimated coefficients     =         8          Obs per group: min =         6
Estimated autocorrelations =         0          Number of groups   =        11
Estimated covariances      =         1          Number of obs      =        76
Correlation:   no autocorrelation
Panels:        homoskedastic
Coefficients:  generalized least squares
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
 
  _est_fixed          77     .987013    .1139606          0          1
          d1          77    .4935065    .5032363          0          1
         gcg          77          15    3.183014         10         20
 age_in_year          77    38.09091    28.83765          1         85
                                                                      
      opervi          77    15.93089    1.398243   9.401043   18.23706
       fsize          77    18.39809    .8091785   16.96834   20.65224
        leve          77    .5085471    .2202952   .0611014   .8269072
       liqud          77    2.135935     1.72031   .4903508    9.23599
         eff          77    .1869522    .1262358   .0109197   .4085041
                                                                      
      equity          77    .4861284    .2224185   .1729034   .9391285
      profit          76    .2419149    .1207847   .0211472   .4633958
         dsc          77    .3785697    .2846163   .0137864   1.142032
        year          77        2002    2.013115       1999       2005
       firms          77           6    3.183014          1         11
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. sum
 
